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The expansion of arms-length government is not necessarily at
odds with democratic accountability
How democratic is arms-length government? Catherine Durose, Jonathan  B. Justice and Chris Skelcher
argue that those who consider it to be an undemocratic phenomenon over-simplify, and make the case for
assessing the question in a more citizen and community focussed manner.
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It is relatively uncontroversial to assert that modern democracies should aspire not only to democracy but also to
efficiency and reliance when and as appropriate on expert, evidence-based judgments in designing and
implementing governing arrangements and public policies. It is also frequently accepted that these values are
often at odds with one another. Can we have both democracy and efficiency in governance? The still-expanding
practice of decentralization and delegation of a variety of activities from national and subnational governments to
a variety of non-state organizations has been portrayed as evidence supporting both negative and affirmative
answers to that question.
Is this practice of “arms-length government” – the use of organisations other than government departments or
ministries to undertake public functions such as developing policies, allocating resources, delivering services, and
performing a variety of regulatory and adjudicatory functions – counter-democratic? Our research suggests that
the answer is something like “not necessarily,” and “it depends.” Close centralized state control is not in every
case necessarily democracy-enhancing, but neither can it be dispensed with thoughtlessly.
The challenge for institutional designers and operators is to distinguish the specific combinations of objectives,
contexts, and governing designs that can achieve a favorable balance of democracy, expertise, and efficiency.
More controversially, we suggest that many well intentioned advocates who share those three broad goals may
need to abandon their familiar state-centric perspectives on the problem if they hope to solve it.
One dominant, state-centric perspective on arms-length government sees it as delegated governance, and
suggests that agency problems and conflicts of interest will tend to lead to a democratic deficit when governing
tasks are delegated (by the elected representatives who lead the state, which is the seat of legitimate collective
authority) to independent agencies or quasi- or non-governmental organizations.
From this perspective the use of “arms-length” or “third-party” entities may be portrayed as a way to ensure
market efficiency, reliance on technical expertise, and consistent decision-making and implementation, albeit at
the expense of diminishing democracy  by reducing the directness of elected representatives’ control over
decisions and operations. Or, in some variants of the argument, this delegation trades “democracy” in the form of
maximizing individuals’ welfare against “democracy” in the form of engaging individuals actively and expanding
their capacity for collective self-determination.
An alternative, “polycentric” perspective articulated in the work of scholars including Elinor and Vincent Ostrom,
Bruno Frey, and Archon Fung, views the state not as the sole seat of legitimate governing authority but rather as
one locus of  democratically legitimate decision making and authority: often necessary, but not always an optimal
or sufficient instrument of self-governance and collective action.
This perspective views individuals and communities rather than the state as the basic locus of legitimacy, and
suggests that questions about the normative desirability of governing and service-provision arrangements should
be approached empirically and on a case-specific basis. This approach complicates the task of design and
evaluation by offering only “it depends” as the generic answer to the arms-length question, but compensates for
the additional effort by offering a way for us to see and realise possibilities that might be missed by dismissing
non-state institutions of collective action out of hand.
We recently completed a multi-year project, funded by the ESRC, that brought together scholars, practitioners
and activists from several countries, sectors, and types of organisation to explore the question of “arms-length
government” or “governing beyond the state” in research seminars we organised at the University of Birmingham
and De Montfort University. We took away from those discussions an appreciation of the manifold ways in which
the polycentric perspective offers not just a valuable theoretical framework for designing and evaluating
governing arrangements but also a way to make sense of the astonishing variation in the types and quality of
arrangements in use today.
One set of lessons drawn from the seminars is compiled in the pamphlet Beyond the State: Mobilizing and Co-
Producing with Communities. In the first part of the pamphlet, organizers Alejandra Ibañez and Lina Jamoul and
researcher Liz Richardson demonstrate how community organizing and self-organization can potentially mobilize
local resources for the co-design and co-production of services and empower diverse communities through
constructive advocacy and negotiation. They trace the progression from oppositional mobilization to the
negotiation of arrangements that generated shared power to and with in case studies from Chicago and London.
In the second part, Catherine Needham, Janet Newman, Chris Sherwood, and Jess Steele note that the language
of co-production encompasses both the liberation and empowerment of power to and power with, and a darker
side of more coercive personalization of centrally designed and dispensed services.
In a subsequent review of academic literature on arms-length government, we built on a key insight we gained
from the contributors to the pamphlet. A shift in perspective from the state-centric model of legitimate and
accountable governance to a polycentric perspective facilitates the analysis of approaches to collective choice
and public policies in ways that engage with the potential for undemocratic or inequitable results as one relevant
design consideration, rather than as an inevitable product of “delegation” by elected officials. (The article,
published in Policy & Politcs, is available here.)
In short, blanket generalisations about the negative implications of arm’s-length government for the quality of
democracy, based on narrowly state-centric models of democratic legitimacy and accountability, are often
factually incorrect and unnecessarily limit the scope of analysis in ways that may foreclose opportunities to
increase both democracy and efficiency. At the same time, in the world of political practice, the increasing
frequency and diversity of applications in a variety of contexts provides an abundance of material for thoughtful
empirical assessment, particularly if we approach it in a way that views strong state institutions as one part of a
larger configuration of institutions, rather than as the only legitimate seat of democracy.
And in fact, it is clear that citizens, practitioners, and scholars around the world are taking up the challenges of
designing, implementing, evaluating, and then redesigning configurations of institutions and practices that
sometimes manage to increase community power (to and with) and democracy.
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